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Abstract
This paper investigates the osetting eect theory, using individual-level accident data
to analyze how drivers respond to seat-belt laws. I nd that drivers drive their vehicles
more carefully when more stringent seat-belt laws are in eect. I also nd that careful
driving is not associated with pedestrian involvement in accidents. Using synthetic panel
data, I nd that the change in the laws results in an increased number of careful drivers and
a decreased number of careless drivers in accidents. The results show that the osetting
eects are weaker than expected or may not exist in accidents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely accepted that mandatory seat belt laws reduce fatalities among drivers who wear seat belts.
However, there have been ongoing discussions regarding the eectiveness of these laws. According to
the osetting eect theory, suggested by Peltzman (1975), since drivers wearing seat belts feel more
secure, they drive less carefully, and therefore cause more fatal accidents involving pedestrians. If seat-
belt laws resulted in more pedestrian involvement in accidents and the resulting fatalities were sizeable
enough to oset the decrease in the fatalities of drivers and passengers, then seat belt regulation would
be considered ineective. This paper investigates the existence of the osetting behavior.
Many earlier studies have investigated the eects of seat-belt laws on the fatality rates of drivers
and passengers. Some have directly tested the eectiveness of the seat belt laws on the fatalities of
the non-occupants who are involved in fatal accidents. These tests show mixed results. Furthermore,
even some supporting results do not provide direct evidence on the relationship between the laws and
the osetting (or adverse) behavior, even though many factors are appropriately controlled for in the
models. This lack of direct evidence is inevitable when either aggregated state-level or survey data are
used.
My paper uses individual-level accident data. There are several advantages in using individual-
level data for this type of research. First, individual-level accident data can correctly control for het-
erogeneity among drivers and identify each driver's behavioral dierences. Second, the osetting eect
theory is about a recursive relationship: The laws cause drivers' adverse behavior, and in turn, the
adverse behavior leads to the frequent involvement of non-occupants in accidents. It is easier to identify
this recursive structure using individual-level data. Third, disaggregate data provides rich details on
individual and accident-specic characteristics, so once panel data is constructed from individual-level
data through an aggregation process, we can easily control for unobservable factors without losing
factors that aect the evolution of number of accidents, such as time trends.
This paper answers three major questions. First, would seat belt laws cause more-aggressive
or less-careful driving behavior? By looking at individual accident data with the specic locations of
crashes, I investigate if there is a direct link between the laws and the behavioral changes. Second, if
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the change in behavior exists, would the less-careful driving behavior result in more pedestrians and
non-occupant involvement in accidents? Third, how does less-careful driving behavior play a role as
a link between laws and non-occupant involvement? To answer these questions, this paper develops
unique models (both cross-section and panel data models) to identify drivers' behavioral changes by
observing each individual driver's response to the law changes, and see if the numbers of accidents
involving less-careful drivers or non-occupants increase.
The osetting eect theory says that the probability of accidents with protection is greater than
the probability of accidents with no protection. Therefore, the theory is about either an increase or a
decrease in fatality rates of non-occupants because of less-careful driving behavior, which results from
more-stringent seat-belt laws. As a result, some might argue that we cannot test the eect if we only
use individual accident data and that the accident data only consists of a subset of all drivers on the
road, less-careful drivers. Relatively careful drivers are not involved in accidents, so these people argue
that the accident data can only help identify drivers' behavioral change in the subset of the population,
but not the change in fatality rates.
There are two groups of people on the roads: an accident group and a non-accident group.
People in the accident group are involved in accidents, while people in the non-accident group are not.
We can say that people in the accident group are relatively less careful, on average, than people in
the non-accident group. The osetting eect theory assumes that the laws make \some drivers" less
careful and that their less-careful driving behavior causes them to have accidents involving pedestrians.
Therefore, these less-careful drivers can be in both the accident and the non-accident group. If the
drivers are in the accident group, they would not aect the number of accidents because they would
already have caused the accidents. As the result of the law change, only the accident type would change
- no pedestrian involvement to pedestrian involvement. Thus, only the accidental damages increase. If
the less-careful drivers are in the non-accident group, some of them would cause their accidents and be
added to the existing accidents1. This implies that these drivers would not have been included in the
accident data, if more-stringent seat-belt laws had not been in eect. The theory implicitly assumes
that there would be more accidents involving pedestrians if drivers became less careful.
1Not all drivers necessarily cause accidents, even if they become less careful when their level of care does not
reach a certain threshold. Therefore, only some of the drivers would cause accidents.
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What if the laws instead make people more careful? If the laws make some people more careful,
then the same thing occurs in the opposite direction. Again, these more-careful drivers can be in both
groups. If they were in the non-accident group, they wouldn't change anything when they became more
careful because they were already careful enough not to cause an accident. If they were in the accident
group, their more-careful driving behavior made them not cause accidents involving pedestrians. Or even
if they still caused accidents, pedestrians were not involved in accidents. This means that there would
be fewer accidents involving pedestrians if drivers were more careful. In other words, less-careful driving
behavior pushes some additional people, who would otherwise not have been involved in accidents, into
the accident data; more-careful driving behavior pulls some additional people, who otherwise would
have been involved in accidents, out of the data. The necessary condition for this symmetric conclusion
is whether the laws, in fact, change people's behavior, and if they do, in which direction. If I identify
this behavioral change from the accident data, I could make a conclusion, with consistent logic, that
there must be the same behavioral change from those who are not in the accident data. Therefore, with
only individual accident data, I can still verify the implications of the osetting theory. Two distinct
questions should be answered through empirical tests. First, can we observe more- or less-careful driving
behavior from the accident data because of the law change? Second, can we use the accident data to
test if the number of careful or careless behavior increases or decreases? If I nd that the primary seat
belt laws decreased the number of more-careful drivers and increased the number of less-careful drivers
in accidents, I would conclude that the seat belt laws increased the number of accidents, including fatal
accidents. Then, I could conrm that the osetting eect theory exists. Otherwise, I could conclude
that the osetting eects may not exist.
I use two steps to test above arguments. To answer the rst question, I compare two groups
of states - states with and without a seat-belt law change - and see if there are behavioral dierences
between drivers in the dierent states. Second, using only accident data, I produce synthetic panel data
to see if the number of accidents increases or not. The main advantage of using the synthetic panel
data is that we can see if the number of careless drivers involved in accidents increases or decreases
when more stringent laws are applied, even if only individual accident data is available. Therefore, the
synthetic panel data provides us to gure out the change in accidents on the road, as if we have data
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on people who are not involved in accidents too.
I nd that there is a greater probability of having relatively more-careful drivers in accidents
in states where stronger seat belt laws are in eect. In fact, people drive more carefully when more
stringent seat-belt laws are in eect. However, drivers are less careful in neighboring states where there
is no change in the laws, so there is a clear dierence in behavior between people in the states with and
without the law changes. I also nd that careful driving is not associated with pedestrian involvement in
accidents. In terms of the aggregate numbers of accidents, the change in the laws increases the number
of careful drivers and decreases the number of careless drivers in accidents. Since the results show that
there is no relationship between drivers' careful behavior and pedestrian involvement in accidents, it
is hard to believe that the number of accidents involving non-occupants, at least, would increase when
people drive more carefully. These results show that the osetting eects are weaker than expected
or may not exist in general. As a policy implication, I recommend seat-belt laws with strong punitive
penalties. Governments can use this policy tool to increase the expected cost of not wearing a seat belt
and thereby cause less-careful drivers to wear seat belts.
The paper consists of ve sections. In the next section, I review the literature on osetting
behavior. Section III discusses empirical strategy and econometric models. The section also discusses
the recursive structure of people's behavior and the construction of synthetic panel data models. Section
IV describes data and provides summary statistics. Section V discusses estimation results. The last
section draws conclusions and addresses policy implications.
II. LITERATURE
It is widely accepted that seat belt use reduces fatalities among people who wear seat belts. According
to the 2011 survey from the National Highway Trac Safety Administration (NHTSA), seat belt use
has risen steadily, while there has been a steady decline in passenger vehicle occupant fatalities per mile
traveled2. Most economic literature in this eld has focused on whether seat-belt laws have reduced
2NHTSA: Occupant Protection, Trac Safety Facts, 2011 (DOT HS 811 729). The survey says that, in 2011,
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aggregate fatalities or not, regardless of the type of individuals involved in accidents. Many papers
(McCarthy (1999), Derrig et al. (2002)) use time series data and analyze whether there is any statis-
tically signicant dierence before and after seat-belt law enforcement. However, these studies fail to
control for a time trend, and since macro eects unrelated to seat-belt laws also aect fatalities, this is
an important limitation of these studies. The tests, which produce mixed results for osetting eects,
are only a secondary concern to researchers who focus on aggregate fatality rates.
Other studies try to investigate directly if the osetting eect in fact exists3. Among others,
Garbacz(1990) nds a positive relationship between seat belt use and non-occupant fatality. Recent
studies use panel data models using state-level data. Evan and Graham (1991) use pooled data from 50
states. They nd that there is weak evidence that non-occupant fatalities increase, and they conclude
that osetting behavior appears to be small relative to lifesaving eects. Cohen and Einav(2003) look
at the eects of the laws on non-occupant fatalities to investigate the osetting eect. They notice a
potential endogeneity problem of using seat-belt use, and they use seat-belt laws as an instrument for
use. They do not nd any signicant evidence of compensating behavior. These studies focus on the
factors that aect fatalities and use the increase in the fatality rate as evidence of osetting behavior.
Some of the empirical studies focus on personal characteristics of individuals. Researchers nd
that heterogeneity across individuals is important (Sen & Mizzen (1992 and 2007)). Loeb (1995) uses
monthly accident data in only one state to remove the statewide dierences in the laws. He nds that the
state's seat-belt law results in a reduction in the various driver-involved injury rates. After controlling
for state-specic characteristics, researchers could easily nd whether the laws in dierent states reduce
fatalities, given a xed number of fatalities. However, it is very dicult to observe an individual
driver's behavioral change and test if this behavioral change aects fatalities using state-level data.
Furthermore, there is no direct link between behavioral changes and the laws. State-level data obtained
from surveys is subject to serious measurement error concerns and unobserved hetereogeneity given the
21,253 occupants of passenger vehicles (passenger cars, pickup trucks, vans, and SUVs) died in motor vehicle
trac crashes. Among them, 9,439 were restrained. Restraint use was not known for 1,634 occupants. Looking
at only occupants where the restraint status was known 52 percent were unrestrained at the time of the crash.
Thinking that seat belt use in the same year was 84 percent, fatal crashes involve much more people not wearing
seat belts.
3Earlier studies include Peltzman (1975, 1977), Robertson (1977), Crandall and Graham (1984), Gar-
bacz(1990), Evans and Graham (1991), Keeler (1994), and Loeb (1995).
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lack of control for individual-level characteristics of each driver, each vehicle, and the environmental
conditions surrounding the accidents.
Sobel and Nesbit (2007) use individual-level data to test for individual human responses to
safety improvements within a well-controlled environment. The two authors use data from the National
Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR). Their results strongly support the presence of
osetting behavioral eects. However, NASCAR drivers are constantly pushing safety limits when
they drive, so it is expected that the authors would nd a clear osetting eect among these drivers.
Professional racecar drivers drive on a closed course, and participate in a competition in which the
objective is to beat all other drivers; they are not representative of average drivers on our roads.
Many studies only use data from fatal crashes. Using only fatal crashes may not accurately
measure the eectiveness of a safety regulation and may result in sample selection bias. In order to
remove this bias, some (Levitt et al. (2001)) have proposed that researchers only include crashes in
which someone in a dierent vehicle dies. Singh and Thayer (1992) use models based on individual-
specic survey data to see if seat belt use aects the number of citations for moving violations. Their
results show that the compensating behavior hypothesis only applies to individuals who are not strongly
risk-averse, and that individual risk preferences are an important dimension. They nd that drivers'
risk preferences may be irrelevant to the behavioral change, and that the existence of the osetting
behavior may not necessarily be what causes increased non-occupant involvement.
My paper does not investigate the eects of seat belt laws on trac fatalities. The question that
I address is whether I can identify the direct link between the behavioral change due to the laws and
accidental harm, including fatalities. To answer this question, I use individual-level accident data over
a ve-year period from the National Highway Trac and Safety Administration (NHTSA)4.
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND ECONOMETRIC MODELS
1. Overall Estimation Strategy
4The detailed description of the data is discussed in section VI.
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Based on the discussion in the introduction section, I address two major questions. First, to identify
behavioral dierences with and without the law change, I need to use the same subsets of people with
the same distribution of carefulness on the road: both accident data in dierent states. I compare
accidents in one state with accidents in its neighboring state. Therefore, I choose two groups of states:
one group of states consists of the states that change their seat-belt laws over the studied period (2004
through 2008), and the other group of states consists of the neighboring states with no change in the
laws during the same period. I call the rst group \primary states" and the second group \non-primary
states". Since both groups are made up of drivers involved in accidents, I can consider these people
equally less careful drivers on average compared to drivers who are not involved in accidents, if there is
no law change in both groups of states. If the primary states change their laws and people's behavior
changes because of the law change, then the seat-belt laws must have played a role in altering people's
driving behavior. To see this, I treat the neighboring states as if they also change laws. If drivers of
these two adjacent states showed a dierent behavioral pattern, I will be able to conclude that the
seat-belt laws do aect drivers' behavior.
Second, I develop a synthetic panel data model to answer the second question5. This is a
technique that uses independently selected cross-sections over time to produce panel data. The technique
is used when there is no actual panel data or only data for a sub-sample of a population, such as accident
data. Therefore, even though I only have accident data, I can still see if the number of a certain type
of accidents, involving careless or careful drivers, increases or decreases within a panel data framework,
and I can determine whether the primary seat-belt laws change the number of accidents. Assuming
that less-careful drivers would also cause more accidents involving pedestrians, more-careful drivers may
have a greater probability of not having pedestrians involved in their accidents than less-careful drivers.
Therefore, if there are more pedestrians involved in accidents, this could be indirect evidence of more
accidents involving pedestrians because of the seat-belt laws. If the drivers in the subset are not related
5This econometric technique has recently developed and carefully used in the limited settings, depending on
the nature of studies. It is essentially impossible to observe an individual driver's behavior and his or her response
to seat belt laws over time. Thus, the technique groups drivers whose characteristics are similar into a type. We
then track the drivers' behavior over time through these types. So, each type behaves as if it were an individual.
For more details, see Deaton (1985), Deaton & Irish (1985), Verbeek & Nijman (1992), and, recently, Bae &
Bentez-Silva (2011)
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to the cause of accidents, their behavioral change due to the laws may lead to more or less non-occupant
involvement in accidents. Therefore, the change in the number of accidents involving less-careful drivers
and more non-occupant involvement, such as pedestrians, can be veried by the synthetic panel data
model.
2. Behavioral Dierences in Accidents
I use police accident data from the National Highway Trac Safety Administration (NHTSA). The
General Estimates System (GES) in the NHTSA gets its data from a nationally representative proba-
bility sample selected from the estimated six million police-reported crashes that occur annually. The
data essentially consists of police accident reports (PAR). This data contains each detailed crash de-
scription, which includes information on the people and vehicles involved and the detailed description
of the accident, including environmental factors6.
First, I observe each accident that occurred between 2004 and 2008. During the time period,
seven states have changed their seat belt laws from secondary to primary laws. I will therefore focus on
the accidents that occurred in these seven states7. Within a state, accidents occur either before or after
the enforcement date of the primary seat belt law. These are \pre-accidents" and \post-accidents,"
respectively. I test if there are behavioral dierences among drivers who have accidents before and after
the enforcement date. Each observation is a driver who is involved in an accident. The observation has
one variable - the zip-code - of the driver's home address 8. It also tells us when the accident occurred.
The data tells us whether or not the accident occurs under the primary seat-belt law. Since accidents
occur on dierent dates within a state and across the states, some occur before, and some occur after the
primary seat-belt laws are adopted. I use drivers' careless behavior to measure the behavioral dierence
6Since the GES contains a sample from all accidents, one cannot use this data to see the eects of seat belt
laws on fatalities. This contains accidents with no, minor, or severe injuries, as well as deaths. Therefore, it
should be understood that accidental damages include both lives lost and people injured along with property
damages.
7The NHTSA changed many variables in 2009 and merged two data sets into one in 2010 and 2011. Therefore,
I use data only between 2004 and 2008 to keep the data consistent.
8Some drivers cause accidents in other states rather than their states. They are travelers and commuters.
However, the data set does not include information on the exact locations of crashes. There is no reason to
believe that most drivers experience accidents in other states rather than their states. Thus, drivers' addresses
are used.
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before and after the enforcement date. Each observation shows whether or not the driver was careless
at the time of crash9. Careless behavior includes talking on, listening to, or dialing a phone; adjusting
climate control, the radio, or a CD; using other devices integral to the vehicle; sleeping, eating, or
drinking; smoking-related distractions; and any other actions that take attention away from driving10.
I will see if driver behavior, measured by careless behavior, is dierent before and after the enforcement
date of the seat-belt law.
Second, even if the above relationship is statistically signicant, the relationship itself doesn't
provide anything meaningful because we are nding careless drivers among already less-careful drivers.
Therefore, we should compare the same type of subsets, accidents data from seven primary and seven
non-primary (neighboring) states. I select seven neighboring states that did not change the laws over
the same period. I divide accidents again into two groups - pre-accidents and post-accidents - as if
the neighboring states changed the seat belt laws. For example, Mississippi is a primary state that
changed the law from secondary enforcement to primary enforcement on May. 27, 2006, so all accidents
that occurred before this date are pre-accidents, and accidents that occurred after the date are post-
accidents. I choose Louisiana as one of Mississippi's neighboring states. Louisiana adopted its primary
seat-belt law in 1995, so there was no law change between 2004 and 2008. However, I grouped Louisiana
accidents into pre- and post-accidents. If accidents occurred before May. 27, 2006, then they are pre-
accidents; others are post-accidents. If the drivers in these two states showed the same behavioral
pattern, then we could conclude that the laws failed to change people's behavior. In addition to these
seven neighboring states, I also randomly choose another seven states11. These states are assigned to
9Some may argue that the GES data is not reliable because the denition of less careful behavior may dier
from accident to accident, depending on where the accidents occur and who records the information. Drivers
involving in accidents may tend to conceal their faulty or careless behavior, if they believe that they cause the
accidents. Taking this into account, if I found that the primary seat belt laws resulted in less-careful behavior,
then we could conclude that the osetting eects would be larger than expected. If the laws led to more careful
behavior, then the eects would be smaller, even if the eects existed.
10I use the denition of careless behavior from the NHTSA. The GES data contains information on drivers'
careless behavior. The distracted data set has a variable, \MDRDSTRD". This variable identies all distractions
that may inuence driver performance. Most distractions are caused by drivers, although some distractions are
caused by outside factors, such as non-occupants. However, most of them could have been avoided if drivers had
been careful while driving. See also other details from the US Department of Transportation, 2011.
11I use these random states because the neighboring states might be aected by the law change in the primary
states, and two adjacent states might be economically integrated. As we see in the summary statistics, the drivers
in the primary states are relatively less careful than those in the neighboring or randomly assigned states.
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each primary state, and accidents are divided into pre- and post-accidents, as if the accidents in these
random states occurred in the primary states. If the relationship between the primary seat belt laws
and careless behavior in these states were similar to that in the primary states, then the osetting
eect - or any type of statistical relationship - would not prove the impact of the primary seat-belt laws
whatsoever.
One thing to note is that the osetting eect does not only explain careless driving behavior but
whether more non-occupants are involved in accidents because of less-careful driving when the primary
seat belt laws are in force. Therefore, there is a recursive structure for this argument: If drivers feel
secure because of the seat belt laws, they may drive less carefully through careless actions, which, in
turn, may result in a greater probability of causing accidents involving more non-occupants. Because
this recursive relationship between laws, driving behavior, and non-occupant involvement results in
simultaneity, separate estimation could cause biases, and the pooled bivariate probit model is a natural
specication to employ12. Since this model is qualitatively dierent from the typical bivariate probit
model, it is a recursive, simultaneous-equation model13. The bivariate probit model is
ymi = 
0
ixmi + iy

li + mi; ymi = 1 if y

mi > 0;
= 0 otherwise;
(1)
E[m] = E[l] = 0, 8 m 6= l,
V ar[m] = V ar[l] = 1, 8 m 6= l,
Cov[m; l] = , 8 m 6= l.
The bivariate normal cdf, (x1; x2; ), is Prob(X1 < x1; X2 < x2) =
Z x2
 1
Z x1
 1
n(z1; z2; )dz1dz2.
, where m = 1 and 2.
If there is no recursive structure between two equations, then separate probit models should
be used. In this case, factors other than seat-belt laws should explain non-occupant involvement in
12A panel data model is an ideal model for this research. However, it is not possible to construct panel data from
the GES data set. The data set is basically repeated cross-sectional. Recent economic literature has developed an
econometric technique (Synthetic (or Pseudo) panel data model) that produces panel data from cross-sectional
data.
13See Green (2003) and Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) for more details.
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accidents. As we will see later, the regression results show that there is no recursive structure. The
variance-covariance matrix of the cross-equation error terms is estimated, and the null hypothesis 12 = 0
is tested with a Wald test at the 5 percent level. The Wald test shows that there is no correlation
between the error terms14. Therefore, the model shows that non-occupant involvement is not linked to
the primary seat-belt laws through drivers' careless behavior. Therefore, two separate probit models
must be used to determine the eects of the primary seat belt laws on both careless behavior and
pedestrian involvement.
3. The Number of Accidents
To answer the second question, I produce a synthetic panel data model from the accident data to see
if there is a change in the number of accidents. The synthetic panel model groups drivers into several
cohorts according to their personal characteristics and observes their behavioral changes over time and
across the cohorts. I construct cohorts using gender, states, and four age groups. Each cohort contains
drivers with similar characteristics. For instance, one cohort contains drivers who are all males between
16 and 25 years old who all live in the same state. I observe the number of drivers in this cohort over
time. The number of people in the cohorts may increase or decrease across observations and over time,
so I can consider this numerical change to be the increase or the decrease in a certain type of accidents.
These numbers in cohorts include both careless and careful drivers. Since I need to know whether the
number of careless drivers in a cohort increases or decreases, drivers in a cohort are divided into two
groups: careless drivers and careful drivers. If the numbers of careless and careful drivers increase
and decrease, respectively, then I can conclude that the primary seat belt laws lead to more accidents
involving careless drivers15.
The General Estimates System (GES) accident data is a sample. Therefore, to reach a national
estimate, I should not give all accidents equal weight. The GES says that in order to calculate estimates
of national crash characteristics, data from each police accident report on le must be weighted. The
142(1) = :1391. Prob > 2 = :7091. Convergence was not achieved, so I limited the number of iteration to 10.
15There is a reason why drivers in a cohort are divided into two groups. These drivers are all in accident data.
It is necessary to focus on careful drivers among them because they relatively represent the entire population
(all people on the road) better. However, I also calculate the ratio of less-careful drivers to all drivers in my
regression. The estimation result is in Table 8.
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accident data contains a weight for each accident. Therefore, the number of drivers in a cohort in my
model is the weighted number.
Using this grouping, 40 dierent cohorts are created16. Since there are seven states, the total
number of observation is 280. These observations are used for the synthetic panel data model17.
The econometric equations are:
ln(CARELESS)it = Xit + 1PRIMARYit + ci + "it; i = 1; :::; 56 and t = 2004; :::; 2008 (2)
ln(CAREFUL)it = Xit + 2PRIMARYit + ci + "it; i = 1; :::; 56 and t = 2004; :::; 2008 (3)
ln(NON PEDS)it = Xit + 3PRIMARYit + ci + "it; i = 1; :::; 56 and t = 2004; :::; 2008 (4)
ln(PEDS)it = Xit + 4PRIMARYit + ci + "it; i = 1; :::; 56 and t = 2004; :::; 2008 (5)
where, i is a type and t is a year. The dependent variables measure the number of drivers (or accidents) in
a cohort, and they are all natural logarithms of the numbers. CAREFUL is the number of non-careless
drivers in a cohort, while CARELESS is the number of distracted drivers in a cohort. NON PEDS
and PEDS are the numbers of accidents without and with pedestrians respectively. Xit includes
independent variables that are used to group drivers. I estimate this model for careful and careless
groups to nd overall eects. If the osetting eects are strong or present when the primary seat-belt
laws are in eect, the number of careful drivers will decrease, and the number of careless drivers will
increase. If both increase, then the result could be ambiguous18. I repeat the same procedure for the
seven neighboring states to see if there is any dierence between the primary states and the neighboring
states.
16Each state has eight dierent types. Seven states are included in this model. Two states, Alaska and Maine,
are dropped because of econometric issues. Both states have very few accidents in the original data set, so if I
grouped them into several cohorts, the number of observations each cohort would be very small. If the size of the
cohorts is too small the synthetic panel data model will result in measurement errors.
17There is a trade-o between the pooled probit and the panel models in terms of econometric benets. To
ameliorate individual unobserved heterogeneity that changes over time, the panel model is more desirable. How-
ever, there is no panel data. The only way is to construct the synthetic panel model, which may result in another
problem. Not all the independent variables used in the bivariate probit model can be used, so we cannot control
for these within the model. Only the variables that are used to make cohorts should be used. If other variables
were used, by calculating their group averages, then the measurement error problem would arise.
18Since most accidents do not involve pedestrians, we can still measure the directional change: either increase
or decrease.
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IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
1. Data
I use two sources of data. The rst source of data is about the seat-belt laws. There are two types
of law enforcement: primary enforcement, in which occupants can be pulled over and ticketed simply
for not using their seat belts, and secondary enforcement, in which occupants must be stopped for
another violation, like speeding, before they can be ticketed for not using their seat belts19. Thus,
primary enforcement is a much stronger regulatory tool. As of 2013, all U.S. jurisdictions except New
Hampshire have some sort of seat-belt statute, primary or secondary. Many states, such as Connecticut,
New York, and Texas, adopted primary seat belt laws in the mid-1980s, while some states, such as West
Virginia, adopted primary laws more recently (Table 1). Now, 34 states have primary seat belt laws
in eect (Table 1)20, and the coverage of seat belt use diers from state to state. Due to changes in
law enforcement, seat belt use has increased consistently over time; use reached 86 percent in 201221.
However, many states still adopt secondary seat-belt laws.
The second source of data is the GES accident data from the NHTSA. There are several ad-
vantages to using this data. First, it contains detailed information on individual driver's behavior,
such as careless driving behavior, alcohol consumption, and non-occupant involvement, as well as other
behavioral changes at the time of the crash, before the crash, and after the crash. This information
allows me to observe each driver's detailed behavior. Second, the data contains vehicle characteris-
tics, such as model year, vehicle age, and vehicle contribution factor. Previous literature shows that
the vehicle age aects drivers' behavior (Crandall & Graham (1984)), so I identify what model year
vehicles were involved in a particular accident. Third, each observation has a zip code, so I know the
state in which the accident occurred at that particular time. The zip code for each observation is the
main link between the seat belt law in the state and the accident. Furthermore, this data set includes
environmental factors, road conditions, weather conditions, and personal characteristics. These char-
19NHTSA, \Trac Safety Use in 2008", DOT HS 811 036.
20Even though many states adopt primary seat belt laws, the coverage and the maximum nes dier from state
to state. For instance, Texas charges $ 200, for a seat-belt violation, while many states only charge $ 10.
21\Seat Belt Use in 2012 Use Rates in the States and Territories", NHTSA.
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acteristics are unique to each observation and are used as control variables to account for individual
(crash-specic) heterogeneity. For instance, even if two crashes occur in the same state on a same date,
These characteristics can explain the variations between the accidents. Controlling for these factors
allows me to see the eects of primary seat belt laws on drivers' behavior. Otherwise, the coecient
of the seat belt law would be biased because of the heterogeneity aecting the behavior, even though I
control for state-xed and year-xed eects.
Since I focus on the states that have changed their seat belt laws between 2004 and 2008, I
only use accidents that occurred in these states22. Over the time period, more than 82,000 people were
involved in crashes in these states (Appendix D.). Drivers consist of 70 percent of the people (57,700
individuals). Since non-occupants do not aect drivers' behavioral change in response to the laws, I
only use the observations for drivers.
2. Summary Statistics: Cross-Section Data Model (Probit Model)
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the probit models. This table is for the primary states. Since there
are two equations, two dependent variables are constructed; both are dummy variables. The dependent
variable CARELESS measures whether the driver was distracted at the time of the accident. This
behavior is caused by the driver, not by other people or objects on the road, so the variable directly
measures the driver's mistakes or careless behavior. If the driver in an accident is careless, then the
value is 1; otherwise, the value is zero. Careless behavior includes the driver's talking on, listening
to, or dialing a phone; adjusting climate control, the radio, or a CD; eating or drinking; smoking-
related distractions; using or reaching for other devices integral to the vehicle; sleeping; and any other
distractions or inattention23. About 20 percent of the drivers were careless when accidents occurred.
In the second equation, the dependent variable NON OCCUPANTS measures the involvement of
non-occupants - such as pedestrians and bikers - in the accident. If any non-occupant is involved in the
accident, then the value is 1; otherwise, the value is zero. About 1.6 percent of the drivers experienced
22As I pointed out in the previous section, there is a data-matching problem in the GES in later years, so I use
accident data until 2008 in order to classify variables consistently.
23Some drivers were distracted by vehicle occupants, non-occupants, or outside objects at the time of the crash.
However, the drivers could have avoided these types of distractions if they had been more attentive. Note that
this information is self-reported by the driver, occupants, or eyewitnesses.
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non-occupant-related accidents.
Independent variables include three main factors: individual accident-level, state-xed, and year-
xed factors along with the seat belt law24. The main variable PRIMARY is an indicator. If an accident
occurs before the enforcement date in the state, then the value is zero; otherwise, the value is 1. More
than 60 percent of accidents occurred when the primary seat belt laws were in eect.
The average driver age is 38, and 60 percent of the drivers in the sample are males. ALCOHOL
measures whether alcohol is involved in the accident at the time of the crash. If alcohol is involved,
then the value is 1; otherwise the value is zero. Slightly less than 7 percent of accidents were related to
alcohol. STRIKING measures the role of the vehicle in the crash. I include the vehicle age variable,
V EHICLE AGE, to measure drivers' behavioral dierences with regards to how old their vehicles are.
The average vehicle age is 7.6 years. To account for a possible non-linear relationship, I also include
V EHICLE AGE SQ. NIGHT measures when the accident occurs. If the accident occurs between
7:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., then the value is 1; otherwise, the value is zero. About 23 percent of the
accidents occurred at night. The variable is correlated with alcohol consumption, which may cause
careless behavior. HIGH POP is a dummy variable that indicates the density of the population. If
the accident occurs in the area with 100,000 residents or more, then the value is 1; otherwise, the value
is zero 25. I expect drivers to act more carefully while driving in highly populated areas.
Many variables that reect road and weather conditions are included. If the road surface is
dry, then DRY SURFACE is 1; if it is wet, snowy, or icy, then the value is zero. The variable
measures road conditions. About 80 percent of drivers had accidents under good surface conditions.
GOOD WEATHER measures if it is rainy, snowy, sleety, or foggy. If there are no adverse conditions,
the value is 1. LIGHT measures visual conditions. Seventy-two percent of accidents occurred during
daylight. If the accident occurs on the highway, then the variable HIGHWAY has a value of 1.
Most accidents occur on local roads. If the accident occurs in an interchange area, then the value
of INTERCHANGE is 1; otherwise, it is zero. Less than 10 percent of the accidents occurred in
24The denition and the description of each variable is in the appendix.
25The dummy variable is used because of data limitations. Furthermore, since each observation has the zip
code that tells us where the vehicle owner lives, the owner's address and the place the accident occurred will be
dierent. Thus, county-level populations cannot be used in this case. To control for regional population density,
the dummy variable would be ne.
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interchange areas. The variable, SPEED LIMIT , measures the maximum speed limit at the place of
the accident. Since there are dierent maximum speed limits even within a state, this information helps
determine accident-specic variations. The average speed limit is 44 mph26.
State and year dummies are included in the equations to control for state- and year-xed factors.
The states that changed their laws are Alaska, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Tennessee. North Carolina has the most accidents during the studied time period, Ten-
nessee has the second-highest amounts of accidents, and Alaska has the fewest accidents among these
states27.
The summary statistics for both neighboring and randomly assigned states are in the appendix.
Seven neighboring states are Hawaii, Ohio, New Hampshire, Louisiana, Virginia, Georgia, and Alabama.
The other seven random states are Idaho, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Florida, and
Utah28. There are two fundamental dierences between summary statistics. One is that the total
numbers of observation are more in these samples than the sample with the primary states. The other
is that the ratios of the number of accidents with careless drivers to the total number of accidents
in the sample are quite dierent. Almost 20 percent of the drivers was careless in accidents in the
primary state sample, while it was 15.8 percent in the neighboring state sample. Furthermore, it was
13.7 percent in the random state sample. Therefore, the seven primary states had more accidents with
relatively less careful drivers. This could be one of the reasons why these states changed their laws from
the secondary to primary law enforcement during the years studied.
3. Summary Statistics: Synthetic Panel Data Model
The summary statistics for the primary states are in Table 3, and the summary statistics for the
neighboring states is in the Appendix. The average number of drivers in a cohort is 23,132. This
26Some accidents, though not many, occurred in places without any statutory limits - parking lots or alley -,
so the maximum speed limits were zero.
27The GES data is a sampled data from the police accident reports. Therefore, each selected observation has
its own weight to be used to get the national estimate. The frequencies in the sample do not have any meaning
if the weight is not taken into account. However, it suces to use the raw data to see the behavioral dierences
among drivers because I do calculate neither the number of accidents nor fatality rates here. The weights are
used when I construct the synthetic panel data model in the later section.
28They were randomly chosen and assigned by STATA, after removing the seven primary states.
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is a weighted number of drivers. Among them, the numbers of non-careless and careless drivers are
18,411 and 4,720, respectively. The dependent variables are the natural logarithms of these numbers.
I also calculate the ratio of the number of careless drivers to the total number of drivers in a cohort.
If this ratio rises, then more less-careful drivers are involved in accidents. About 24 percent of drivers
are careless drivers; the percentage seems substantial. Since the numbers in cohorts are the weighted
numbers, the accidents involving careless driver behavior might have more weight. I create another
dependent variable to measure the number of accidents involving non-occupants in a cohort. Since
most accidents do not have pedestrians, the number of drivers in accidents with pedestrians is quite
small29.
Most independent variables are the ones used to construct the synthetic panel data. The main
independent variable PRIMARY measures if the primary seat belt laws were in eect at the time of
the accident. Since the observations are annual, each cohort has a value of 1 if the primary seat belt
law changed in that year or in subsequent years; otherwise, the value is zero. The gender and age
variables are all control variables. Year and state dummies are also used to construct the panel data.
To compare the primary states with the neighboring states, I also construct the same panel data with
only neighboring states. They are in the Appendix.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
1. Estimation Results: Cross-Section Data Model (Probit Model)
The estimation results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The sample for the analysis contains states.
Therefore, the dependent variable might be correlated within a cluster (a state), possibly through un-
observed cluster eects (Wooldridge, 2002). This is true even when some control variables are included,
so I use the standard errors that allow for within-state correlation, relaxing the usual requirement that
29Among 200 observations, 75 observations do not have any driver in accidents with pedestrian involvement.
Even though there are 125 remaining observations, the number people in the cohorts are quite small, making
the estimation results less reliable. The estimation results for non-occupant involvement are only presented for
reference.
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the observations be independent. All the t-values are calculated using a robust variance estimate that
adjusts for within-cluster correlation.
Table 4 shows the estimation results for testing if the primary seat belt laws cause drivers to drive
less carefully, while Table 5 shows the estimation results for testing if the laws cause more accidents
involving non-occupants. They are separately estimated using probit models. To compare drivers'
behavior in dierent states, three models are estimated: Primary, Neighboring, and Random States.
As we see in the rst column, the estimation results show that drivers drive more carefully when a
primary seat-belt law is in eect in a state. Careless behavior is negatively associated with PRIMARY,
and the variable is statistically signicant at the 5 percent level. People drive more carefully under
the primary seat-belt law. This nding is surprising because it is the opposite result of what the
osetting eect theory concludes. The second column shows careless driver behavior in neighboring
states when the seat-belt law changes in these drivers' neighboring states, which are the same as the
original primary states studied. Careless behavior is now positively associated with PRIMARY, and
the variable is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. It seems that the osetting eects appear
in states where there is no change in the seat-belt laws. How can we explain this seemingly odd result?
The variable PRIMARY reects pre- and post-primary seat belt periods in the primary states where
new laws are adopted. From the perspective of the original neighboring states, primary states are their
neighbor states. Therefore, drivers in the states with no law change may be aected by the states with
the law change. Knowing that the neighboring state changes its law on a particular date, the drivers in
a state that does not change its law may tend to drive less carefully30. One possible interpretation is
that the drivers in the seven neighboring states had maintained a higher level of carefulness in driving.
More than 20 percent of the drivers were careless in the primary states, while only 16 percent were
careless in the neighboring states31. Therefore, when the law changed, people in the primary states
became relatively more careful, while people in the neighboring states became relatively less careful.
30Interstate commuters may change their driving behavior once they cross the border of the states. This is not
empirically proved. However, this is plausible if we consider a similar situation. With regard to maximum speed
limits, drivers reduce their travel speed as they pass from the roads with higher to those with lower maximum
speed limits.
31This could be the reason why the primary states changed their laws. Compared to the neighboring states,
primary states have a higher ratio of careless drivers in accidents.
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The conclusion is that the primary seat-belt laws change people's behavior in neighboring states as
well as primary states. However, this must be valid only for the neighboring states. As we see in the
third column, the laws do not aect people's behavior in the randomly assigned states. I calculate the
marginal eects of the variable PRIMARY , along with other independent variables. The marginal
eects for the dummy variable are explained by the change in the predicted probability for a change in
PRIMARY from 0 to 1. According to the post estimation from Table 4, changing the seat belt laws
from the secondary to the primary decreases the probability driving carelessly by 17.6 percent in the
primary states and increases the probability by 13.4 percent in the neighboring states32.
Among other control variables, careless behavior is caused by neither age nor gender in the
primary states33. In the neighboring states, younger, male drivers are less careful. Alcohol consumption
is positively associated with careless behavior in the neighboring states. The same results are shown
in the random states34 Drunken drivers are often less careful. Therefore, there is a dierence in driver
behavior between the primary and the non-primary (neighboring or random) states. Drivers in striking
vehicles in accidents were less careful, and it is statistically signicant in all states. The older the
vehicles are, the less careful the drivers are.
The signs of other control variables are what I expected. Careless behavior is found in accidents
that occurred between 7:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. Drivers are more careful in highly populated areas.
During the daylight, drivers are less careful. When it is dark, dawn, or dusk, people drive more
carefully. HIGHWAY is positively associated with careless behavior and statistically signicant only
in the neighboring states. When drivers drive on highways, they are less careful. People are more
careful in interchange areas. Speed limits are not associated with careless behavior, except for people
in neighboring states. This is a seemingly counterintuitive outcome. Drivers are possibly more careful
32The post estimation results are not reported in this paper.
33Most literature shows that young male drivers cause more fatal accidents. My study uses individual-level
accident data. The data includes accidents with all levels of injury and property damage. Therefore, based on
the police-reported accidents, the estimation results show that there is no dierence in careless behavior among
male and female drivers as well as young and old drivers in primary states. Typically, male drivers are less-careful
drivers. However, if both male and female drivers are equally less careful, then there could be statistically no
signicant dierence between genders.
34These randomly assigned states are not related to the primary states at all. Therefore, drivers' careless
behavior should be explained by other factors, such as personal and accident-specic characteristics. We conrm
this conjecture from the estimation results in Tables 4 and 5.
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on the local roads because of frequent obstacles like pedestrians. Drivers may focus on driving when
the roads have lower maximum speed limits. The coecients of year dummies are not statistically
signicant in the primary states, while they are signicant in other states. Most state dummies are
statistically signicant. For instance, drivers in North Carolina were relatively less careful than drivers
in Maine.
Table 5 shows that primary seat-belt laws are not associated with non-occupant involvement.
The coecient PRIMARY is not statistically signicant at any level. This is also true regardless of
states. Therefore, factors other than primary seat-belt laws must explain non-occupant involvement in
accidents35.
Personal characteristics aect non-occupant involvement. Older drivers cause more accidents
involving non-occupants, and the age variable is statistically signicant in all states. Causing accidents
involving non-occupants is not related to gender. Alcohol-related accidents involve fewer pedestrians
and more non-occupants are involved in accidents with striking vehicles. Vehicle age is not associated
with non-occupant involvement. NIGHT is associated with pedestrian involvement. More pedestrians
are involved in accidents in highly populated areas. It is also natural to observe that HIGHWAY is
not statistically associated with NON OCCUPANT since pedestrians are not on the highway. The
coecient, INTERCHANGE, is negative and statistically signicant. That means fewer pedestrians
are involved in accidents that occurred in the interchange areas. This is because most drivers are
more careful when they approach the interchange areas. A higher speed limit is associated with less
pedestrian involvement in both primary and random states; this result implies that most accidents
involving pedestrians occur on roads with lower maximum speed limits, such as local roads. Both year-
and state-dummies are used to control for heterogeneity in years and states.
In summary, I nd that the primary seat-belt laws aect people's behavior and people in dierent
states respond to the laws dierently. This is valid only in the subset of all drivers (the accident
group) on the roads. However, it is still meaningful because I nd drivers' behavioral dierences by
comparing three subsets in dierent states. I also nd that primary seat-belt laws are not associated
35We still need to be very careful in deriving a conclusion here. Non-occupant involvement is not related to the
law change only in this subset of the population. The change in the number of accidents involving pedestrians
due to the laws should be veried in the synthetic panel data model, which will be discussed in the next section.
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with pedestrian-related accidents. The next section will discuss the eects of the laws on the increase
or decrease in certain types of accidents.
2. Estimation Results: Synthetic Panel Data Model
The estimation results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. The random eect models are used.
In Table 6, the rst two synthetic panel models show the estimation results from primary states. The
second two models show the estimation results from neighboring states. The rst two models show that
the number of careful drivers increases (rst column) and the number of less careful drivers decreases
(second column) when a primary seat-belt law is in eect in the state. The coecient of the variable
PRIMARY is highly signicant at the 1 percent level in the careful group and signicant at the 10
percent level in the careless group. If the more stringent seat-belt laws are newly enforced, the number
of careful drivers increases by 99 percent and the number of careless drivers decreases by 26 percent in
accidents. These percentage changes seem quite substantial. However, the result is consistent with the
results from the NHTSA. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), seat
belts reduce serious crash-related injuries and deaths by about 50 percent36. Not all careful drivers
prevent accidents involving serious injuries or death. Thus, some can avoid accidents because of their
careful driving behavior. It must be below 50 percent because even more-careful drivers may still cause
accidents, and most accidents include no injury or minor injuries. This result is consistent with the main
estimation result from Tables 4 and 5. Therefore, the estimation results say that when a state adopts a
more stringent seat-belt law, the number of careful drivers increases in both careful and careless groups
on the road. The t of this model is fairly good, with an R2 close to 85 or 87 percent. In neighboring
states, the number of careful drivers in the careful group decreases, and the variable PRIMARY is
statically signicant (third column), while it (fourth column) is not statistically signicant. The overall
eects of the primary seat-belt laws on driver behavior in neighboring states is the opposite of the eects
in primary states.
Now, I focus on other independent variables only in the rst two columns (Primary States).
Individual characteristics are mostly signicant. With regards to MALE, the number of careful male
36Seat Belts Fact Sheet, NHTSA, 2010. http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/seatbelts/facts.html.
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drivers in the careful group increases, while the number of them in the careless group decreases, so
they are osetting each other. Therefore, male drivers are more careful in the careful group, but female
drivers are more careful in the careless group. The younger the drivers are in the careful group, the less
careful they are in the careful group. The younger drivers are more careful in the careless group, so
they are also osetting. Therefore, I can conclude that both gender and age are not factors that aect
the numbers of careful and careless drivers in accidents on roads in the United States. This result is
also consistent with the estimation results from a later model in Table 8. Most year dummies are not
statistically signicant in the careful group, but they are statistically signicant in the careless group.
This pattern is reversed in the neighboring states. All state-dummies are statistically signicant at the
1 percent level. Drivers also behave dierently in dierent groups, the careful or careless groups. These
drivers also oset each other within the groups.
We need to note one thing: the main disadvantage of the synthetic panel model, however, is that
many environmental factors that are used in the probit model are no longer controlled for. However,
even though the model does not control well for unobserved factors, I obtained a consistent result for
drivers' behavior from dierent model specications.
Table 7 shows the eects of the laws on the number of accidents involving non-occupants. I
divide the driver group into two groups: one consisting of drivers whose accidents did not involve
non-occupants (occupant accidents), and one consisting of drivers whose accidents did involve non-
occupants (non-occupant accidents). The variable, NON PEDS, represents the number of accidents
without pedestrians involved, and PEDS represents the number of accidents with pedestrians involved.
The rst column tests to see if the laws increase or decrease the number of occupant accidents, while
the second column tests to see if the laws change the number of non-occupant accidents. As we see in
the table, the primary seat belt laws are associated with neither the increase nor the decrease in the
number of pedestrians. The coecient PRIMARY is not statistically signicant at any level37.
37The synthetic panel data model should satisfy a condition in order to use it as a valid model: the number
of observation in a cell should be large enough. Since the number of accidents where pedestrians are involved is
quite small, many cohorts do not have any observations. Therefore, the second and the fourth columns have only
125 and 143 observations, respectively, because the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of
drivers (or accidents) involving pedestrians. In this case, the eectiveness of using the synthetic panel model could
be limited. However, it suces to show that primary seat-belt laws are not aecting the number of occupant-
and non-occupant accidents.
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I create a new dependent variable to see the overall eects of the primary seat belt laws on driver
behavior and number of accidents. Then, I run the regression using the panel data model used in Table
6. I do this because some variables are osetting each other. The estimation results are in Table 8.
The new dependent variable CARELESS=TOTAL measures the total number of careless drivers to
the total number of drivers in a cohort. When primary seat-belt laws are in eect, the ratio of careless
drivers on the road decreases in the primary states and increases in the neighboring states. The variable
is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. I also conrm that driver behavior is the opposite in
primary and neighboring states.
In conclusion, the primary seat belt laws are eective in reducing the number of accidents whose
drivers are less careful. However, we need to be very careful in deriving the implications of the osetting
eects. I have used the accident data. It includes all dierent types of accidents in terms of severity of
injuries, including no injury in accidents. Therefore, as the osetting eect theory concludes, we still
do not know if fatal accidents increase or not because of the primary seat belt laws. The GES data also
includes fatal accidents. However, it is not possible to construct panel data only with fatal accidents.
Therefore, it is very important to draw a conclusion with caution: The osetting eects may not exist
or are weaker than expected, if we include all dierent types of accidents.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates the eects of the primary seat-belt laws on driver behavior and non-occupant
involvement. I nd that the osetting eects do not exist when I analyze the accidents using all injury
levels. Primary seat belt laws rather reduce the predicted probability of less-careful driving behavior.
The behavior does not even lead to greater non-occupant involvement. Therefore, the overall eect of
the laws is still eective, assuming that the law reduces fatalities among drivers and passengers38.
38A research note (2006) from the NHTSA found that states with primary enforcement laws have lower fatality
rates. According to the note, the passenger vehicle occupant fatality rates were 1.03 per 100 million vehicle miles
traveled (VMT) and 10.69 per 100,000 population over the period of study. This compares to 1.21 and 13.13
(respectively) for all other states.
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The estimation results from the synthetic panel model also show consistent outcomes. Both the
probit and the synthetic panel data models show that drivers are more careful because of the stringent
law enforcement. Furthermore, the number of more-careful drivers increases, and the number of less-
careful drivers decreases, when primary seat belt laws are in eect, meaning that people become more
careful, regardless of whether they are careful or careless drivers on the road.
One thing to consider is whether the increase in accidental harm from the osetting behavior is
big enough to outweigh the reduction in accidental harm from the seat belt laws, even if I assume that the
osetting behavior really exists or strongly appears. By looking at the descriptive statistics of accident
data (Appendix D), one could nd an intuitive idea of the size of accidental harm of non-occupants.
The General Estimates System (GES) has 82,055 individuals who were involved in the accidents that
occurred in the primary states over the period of study39. Pedestrians and cyclists consisted of only
0.92 percent of them (Appendix D.1.). Drivers and passengers consisted of 98.93 percent of the sample.
Therefore, even if the fatality of non-occupants increases because of the osetting eects, it may not
be sizeable. This becomes clear when I focus on the injury severity levels of non-occupants included in
the sample. Among the 752 non-occupants involved in accidents over the period, only 60 people had a
fatal injury (Appendix D.2.). Seventy-ve percent of the drivers might have caused the accidents due
to their possible mistakes or misbehavior (Appendix D.3.). If we include non-motorist vehicle operators
and other or unknown actions, the percentage increases to 90 percent. Only 10 percent of them (or
6 non-occupants out of more than 82,000 people involved in accidents) had a fatal injury when they
did not take any action. This percentage can be explained by drivers' mistakes or careless (or even
intentionally aggressive) behavior. Even so, there is no guarantee that the seat-belt laws cause this
non-occupant involvement.
From these simple descriptive statistics, it is hard to believe that drivers' less-careful behavior
causes a substantial increase in the number of more-fatal accidents. However, the data set used in this
paper is from the police accident reports obtained from the NHTSA. These six accidents could be even
sizeable if we converted the number into the weighted sum. This weighted number could have been in
39There was no change in the laws in 2008. In 2009, 4 states changed their laws. By including these four states,
we can compare drivers' behavioral dierences between the states with and without the primary seat belt law
over the years of study.
25
the accident data set because of the osetting eects if any. Therefore, as I pointed out in the previous
section, it is very important to draw a conclusion with caution: The osetting eects may not exist or
are weaker than expected, if we include all dierent types of accidents.
Currently, 34 states and the District of Columbia have primary seat-belt laws. Sixteen states
have secondary laws, and New Hampshire has no seat belt law. Some people argue that drivers should
choose whether to wear seat belts as a matter of \personal freedom."40 However, primary seat belt laws
save the lives of drivers as well as passengers, pedestrians, and bikers. This result, along with earlier
studies, shows that primary seat belt laws play an important role in improving public safety on roads
across the United States41.
It is still true that the laws save drivers' lives. As of Jan. 1, 2010, a new state law in Georgia,
the Super Speeder Law, went into eect with substantially higher nes of $ 20042. This law may give
drivers stronger motivation to drive more carefully and strengthen the eects of primary seat-belt laws.
Therefore, punitive penalties, such as higher nes, would make the laws much more eective, if used
together.
For future studies, we may test if joint regulation is more eective in promoting public safety.
We can perform this test by comparing dierent states with and without punitive (nancial) penalties,
given that the states have the same level safety enforcement.
Another possible study can augment my paper. The use of cellular phones has been prevalent in
recent years in the United States. Some states have recently prohibited drivers from using their phones
to call or send text messages while driving. Cellular-phone use could be a major distraction and a cause
of careless driving behavior. My current paper does not incorporate this cellular-phone use into the
model. We could therefore test if there is a relationship between primary seat-belt laws, laws banning
cellular phones, and their joint impacts on road safety.
40For instance, the National Motorists Association(NMA) submitted testimony against a 2003 Wisconsin bill
allowing primary enforcement. Seven years later, the state of Wisconsin passed a primary seat-belt law in 2009.
See more details from \http://www.motorists.org/seat-belt-laws/testimony".
41Not only the seat belt laws improve public safety. Vehicle recall regulation reduces accidental harm. See Bae
& Bentez-Silva (2011 and 2013) for more details.
42See \http://www.safespeedsgeorgia.org/".
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Table 1. Primary Seat Belt Laws - States
State Initial Primary Standard Who is Covered? Maximum
Eective Seatbelt Enforcement In What Seats? Fine
Date Laws? Date 1st Oense
Alabama 07/18/91 Yes 12/09/99 15+ years in front seat $ 25
Alaska 09/12/90 Yes 05/01/06 16+ years in all seats $ 15
Arizona 01/01/91 No 15+ in front seat; 5 through 15 in all seats $ 10
Arkansas 07/15/91 Yes 06/03/09 15+ years in front seat $ 25
California 01/01/86 Yes 01/01/93 16+ years in all seats $ 20
Colorado 07/01/87 No 16+ years in front seat $ 71
Connecticut 01/01/86 Yes 01/01/86 7+ years in front seat $ 15
Delaware 01/01/92 Yes 06/30/03 16+ years in all seats $ 25
DC 12/12/85 Yes 10/01/97 16+ in all seats $ 50
Florida 07/01/86 Yes 06/30/09 6+ in front seat; 6 through 17 in all seats $ 30
Georgia 09/01/88 Yes 07/01/96 18+ in front seat; 6 through 17 in all seats $ 15
Hawaii 12/16/85 Yes 12/16/85 18+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats $ 45
Idaho 07/01/86 No 7+ years in all seats $ 10
Illinois 01/01/88 Yes 07/03/03 16+ in front seat; 18 and younger in all seats $ 25
if driver is younger than 18 years
Indiana 07/01/87 Yes 07/01/98 16+ years in all seats $ 25
Iowa 07/01/86 Yes 07/01/86 11+ years in front seat $ 25
Kansas 07/01/86 Yes 06/10/10 18+ in front seat; 14 through 17 in all seats $ 30
Kentucky 07/15/94 Yes 07/20/06 7+ years in all seats; 6 and younger and $ 25
more than 50 inches in all seats
Louisiana 07/01/86 Yes 01/01/95 13+ years in front seat $ 25
Maine 12/26/95 Yes 09/20/07 18+ years in all seats $ 50
Maryland 07/01/86 Yes 10/01/97 16+ years in front seat $ 50
(eective 10/01/13)
Massachusetts 02/01/94 No 13+ years in all seats $ 25
Michigan 07/01/85 Yes 04/01/00 16+ years in front seat $ 25
Minnesota 08/01/86 Yes 06/09/09 all in front seat; 3 through 10 in all seats $ 25
Mississippi 07/01/94 Yes 05/27/06 7+ years in front seat $ 25
Missouri 09/28/85 No 16+ years in front seat $ 10
Montana 10/01/87 No 6+ years in all seats $ 20
Nebraska 01/01/93 No 18+ years in front seat $ 25
Nevada 07/01/87 No 6+ years in all seats $ 25
New Hampshire n/a No law No law No law
New Jersey 03/01/85 Yes 05/01/00 18+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats; $ 20
7 and younger and more than 80 pounds
New Mexico 01/01/86 Yes 01/01/86 18+ years in all seats $ 25
New York 12/01/84 Yes 12/01/84 16+ years in front seat $ 50
North Carolina 10/01/85 Yes 12/01/06 16+ years in all seats $ 25
North Dakota 07/14/94 No 18+ years in front seat $ 20
Ohio 05/06/86 No 15+ in front seat; 8 through 14 in all seats $ 30
Oklahoma 02/01/87 Yes 11/01/97 13+ years in front seat $ 20
Oregon 12/07/90 Yes 12/07/90 16+ years in all seats $ 110
Pennsylvania 11/23/87 No 18+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats $ 10
Rhode Island 06/18/91 Yes 06/30/11 18+ years in all seats $ 40
South Carolina 07/01/89 Yes 12/09/05 6+ in front seat; 6+ in rear seat with shoulder belt $ 25
South Dakota 01/01/95 No 18+ years in front seat $ 20
Tennessee 04/21/86 Yes 07/01/04 16+ years in front seat $ 50
Texas 09/01/85 Yes 09/01/85 17+ in front seat; 5 through 16 in all seats; $ 200
4 and younger and 36 in or more
Utah 04/28/86 No 16+ years in all seats $ 45
Vermont 01/01/94 No 16+ years in front seat $ 25
Virginia 01/01/88 No 16+ years in all seats $ 25
Washington 06/11/86 Yes 07/01/02 16+ years in all seats $ 124
West Virginia 09/01/93 Yes 07/01/13 8+ in front seat; 8 through 17 in all seats; $ 25
Wisconsin 12/01/87 Yes 06/30/09 8+ years in all seats $ 10
Wyoming 06/08/89 No 9+ years in all seats $ 25
* Source: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), \http://www.iihs.org/laws/SafetyBeltUse.aspx#OR."
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for 7 states with the Primary Seat Belt Laws
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variables:
Careless Action 34236 .1965 .3974 0 1 CARELESS
Involvement of Non-Occupants 53461 .0161 .1259 0 1 NON OCCUPANT
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 53461 .6035 .4892 0 1 PRIMARY
Age 53461 37.6043 16.0054 16 100 AGE
Sex 53461 .6016 .4896 0 1 MALE
Alcohol Consumption 53461 .0670 .2501 0 1 ALCOHOL
Striking Vehicle 53461 .6198 .4854 0 1 STRIKING
Vehicle Age 53461 7.5683 5.5573 0 61 V EHICLE AGE
Vehicle Age Square 53461 88.1623 133.7913 0 3721 V EHICLE AGE SQ
Hour of Crash 53461 .2330 .4227 0 1 NIGHT
Population Density 53461 .4215 .4938 0 1 HIGH POP
Road Condition 53461 .8109 .3916 0 1 DRY SURFACE
Weather Condition 53461 .8526 .3545 0 1 GOOD WEATHER
Light Condition 53461 .7178 .4501 0 1 LIGHT
Inter-State Highway 53461 .0986 .2981 0 1 HIGHWAY
Relation to Junction 53461 .0325 .1774 0 1 INTERCHANGE
Maximum Speed Limit 53461 43.9987 10.4049 0 75 SPEED LIMIT
Year Dummy 2004 53461 .2193 .4138 0 1 Y EAR 2004
Year Dummy 2005 53461 .1888 .3914 0 1 Y EAR 2005
Year Dummy 2006 53461 .2081 .4059 0 1 Y EAR 2006
Year Dummy 2007 53461 .2036 .4027 0 1 Y EAR 2007
Year Dummy 2008 53461 .1802 .3844 0 1 Y EAR 2008
State Dummy Alaska 53461 .0008 .0290 0 1 ALASKA
State Dummy Kentucky 53461 .0862 .2807 0 1 KENTUCKY
State Dummy Maine 53461 .0014 .0374 0 1 MAINE
State Dummy Mississippi 53461 .0216 .1455 0 1 MISSISSIPPI
State Dummy North Carolina 53461 .4991 .5000 0 1 NORTH CAROLINA
State Dummy South Carolina 53461 .0162 .1263 0 1 SOUTH CAROLINA
State Dummy Tennessee 53461 .3746 .4840 0 1 TENNESSEE
* Summary statistics for both neighboring and randomly assigned states are in the appendix.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics - Synthetic Panel Model (Primary State)
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variable:
# of Non-Careless Drivers 200 18411.52 21653.58 0 94366.76 CAREFUL
# of Careless Drivers 200 4720.65 5335.46 0 22137.74 CARELESS
Total # of Driversy 200 23132.18 25626.48 4.8 116439.20 TOTAL
Ln CAREFUL 199 8.7246 1.9005 1.5686 11.4549 Ln CAREFULL
Ln CARELESS 193 7.4637 1.8367 1.2119 10.0050 Ln CARELESS
CARELESS=TOTAL 200 .2403 .1755 0 1 CARELESS=TOTAL
# of Drivers with No Peds 200 34934.62 35195.97 342.13 129455.7 NON PEDS
# of Drivers with Peds 200 210.10 284.02 0 1632.96 PEDS
Total # of Driversz 200 35144.72 35394.92 342.13 129814.9 TOTAL
Ln NON PEDS 200 9.5670 1.5965 5.8352 11.7711 Ln NON PEDS
Ln PEDS 125 5.3312 1.1363 2.5688 7.3981 Ln PEDS
PEDS=TOTAL 200 .0061 .0114 0 .0884 PEDS=TOTAL
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 200 .6 .4911 0 1 PRIMARY
Sex 280 .5 .5009 0 1 MALE
Age between 16 and 25 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 1
Age between 26 and 35 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 2
Age between 36 and 45 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 3
Age over 46 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 4
Year Dummy 2004 280 .2 .4007 0 1 Y EAR 2003
...
Year Dummy 2008 280 .2 .4007 0 1 Y EAR 2007
State Dummy Alaska 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 ALASKA
State Dummy Kentucky 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 KENTUCKY
State Dummy Maine 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 MAINE
State Dummy Mississippi 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 MISSISSIPPI
State Dummy N. Carolina 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 N CAROLINA
State Dummy S. Carolina 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 S CAROLINA
State Dummy Tennessee 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 TENNESSEE
* Summary statistics for neighboring states are in the appendix.
y Sum of careless and non careless drivers in accidents.
z Sum of drivers with pedestrian and no pedestrian involvement in accidents.
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Table 4. Primary Seat Belt Law and Careless Behavior
Probit Model
Primary States Neighboring States Random States
Dependent Variable CARELESS
PRIMARY -.5901 (.2950)** .7112 (.1563)*** -.0572 (.0413)
AGE -.0008 (.0006) -.0014 (.0003)*** -.0006 (.0011)
MALE -.0062 (.0129) .0686 (.0203)*** .0602 (.0139)***
ALCOHOL -.0340 (.0631) .4627 (.1538)*** .2531 (.1229)**
STRIKING .1195 (.0320)*** .3633 (.0707)*** .1414 (.0301)***
VEHICLE AGE .0077 (.0014)*** .0151 (.0015)*** .0027 (.0015)*
VEHICLE AGE SQ -.0002 (.0001)** -.0005 (.0000)*** -.0001 (.0001)
NIGHT .1143 (.0234)*** .3010 (.0148)*** .1588 (.0373)***
HIGH POP -.1610 (.0311)*** -.0195 (.1249) .0294 (.0676)
DRY SURFACE .1562 (.0439)*** .1150 (.0529)** .1930 (.0227)***
GOOD WEATHER .0687 (.0218)*** .1373 (.1018) .1348 (.0578)**
LIGHT -.0050 (.0351) .0928 (.0233)*** .0012 (.0150)
HIGHWAY -.0412 (.0886) .0684 (.0380)* .0397 (.0710)
INTERCHANGE -.1069 (.0751) -.2550 (.0785)*** -.1198 (.0449)***
SPEED LIMIT -.0022 (.0024) .0021 (.0011)* .00004 (.0006)
YEAR 2004 .0092 (.3076) 1.1694 (.4386)*** .3718 (.0846)***
YEAR 2005 .1373 (.1276) .9592 (.2982)*** .1401 (.0512)***
YEAR 2006 -.0303 (.1428) .4227 (.0631)*** -.1850 (.0640)***
YEAR 2007 -.0190 (.0335) .0244 (.0286) -.0855 (.0237)***
(Continued)
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Probit Model
Primary States Neighboring States Random States
Dependent Variable CARELESS
ALASKA -.4157 (.0520)*** - -
KENTUCKY .0154 (.0551) - -
MAINE - - -
MISSISSIPPI -.1076 (.0754) - -
NORTH CAROLINA .2458 (.0778)*** - -
SOUTH CAROLINA .2274 (.1087)** - -
TENNESSEE -.1301 (.1345) - -
HAWAII - -.5164 (.0126)*** -
OHIO - -.4122 (.0667)*** -
NEW HAMPSHIRE - - -
LOUISIANA - -.2246 (.0327)*** -
VIRGINIA - -.1453 (.0293)*** -
GEORGIA - -.1945 (.0230)*** -
ALABAMA - -.2552 (.0436)*** -
IDAHO - - .0222 (.0063)***
CONNECTICUT - - -.0238 (.0039)***
NEW YORK - - .0516 (.0064)***
VIRGINIA - - .0060 (.0056)
PENNSYLVANIA - - -.1011 (.0052)***
FLORIDA - - -.4841 (.0256)***
UTAH - - -
NUM of OBS 34236 40786 66951
y Standard errors are in parentheses.
z Robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation is used.
x **: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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Table 5. Primary Seat Belt Law and Pedestrian Involvement
Probit Model
Primary States Neighboring States Random States
Dependent Variable NON OCCUPANT
PRIMARY -.0292 (.0372) .0919 (.0608) .0054 (.0067)
AGE .0050 (.0007)*** .0024 (.0006)*** .0045 (.0007)***
MALE -.0056 (.0216) -.0085 (.0275) .0353 (.0279)
ALCOHOL -.2302 (.0424)*** -.2001 (.0854)** -.5755 (.0533)***
STRIKING .6213 (.0549)*** .5378 (.0168)*** .7055 (.0285)***
VEHICLE AGE -.0055 (.0052) .0028 (.0011)** -.0045 (.0035)
VEHICLE AGE SQ .0001 (.0004) -.0001 (.0001) .0001 (.0001)
NIGHT .0746 (.0430)* .1080 (.0278)*** .0743 (.0344)**
HIGH POP .1719 (.0183)*** .1536 (.0660)** .4653 (.1875)**
DRY SURFACE .1670 (.0845)** .1852 (.0450)*** .2178 (.0733)***
GOOD WEATHER .0792 (.0864) .0742 (.0543) .0264 (.0855)
LIGHT -.1408 (.0187)*** -.0546 (.0171)*** -.0023 (.0594)
HIGHWAY .1468 (.0927) .2380 (.1723) -.0591 (.1586)
INTERCHANGE -.5535 (.0537)*** -.0827 (.1151) -.5098 (.1153)***
SPEED LIMIT -.0245 (.0017)*** -.0290 (.0027) -.0211 (.0083)**
YEAR 2004 -.1288 (.0134)*** .0215 (.0859) -.0798 (.0645)
YEAR 2005 -.0621 (.0099)*** .0259 (.0894) -.0809 (.0391)**
YEAR 2006 -.1300 (.0228)*** .0396 (.0677) -.0361 (.0350)
YEAR 2007 .0139 (.0135) -.0169 (.0399) -.0074 (.0252)
(Continued)
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Probit Model
Primary States Neighboring States Random States
Dependent Variable NON OCCUPANT
ALASKA - - -
KENTUCKY -.0413 (.0123)*** - -
MAINE - - -
MISSISSIPPI - - -
NORTH CAROLINA .1780 (.0093)*** - -
SOUTH CAROLINA -.0195 (.0053)*** - -
TENNESSEE .0052 (.0289) - -
HAWAII - - -
OHIO - .0591 (.0154)*** -
NEW HAMPSHIRE - - -
LOUISIANA - -.3274 (.0679)*** -
VIRGINIA - -.0523 (.0314)* -
GEORGIA - -.0374 (.0896) -
ALABAMA - -.5195 (.0646)*** -
IDAHO - - -.3245 (.0295)***
CONNECTICUT - - -.0246 (.0314)
NEW YORK - - -.1821 (.0391)***
VIRGINIA - - -.3188 (.0472)***
PENNSYLVANIA - - .1196 (.0448)***
FLORIDA - - .1562 (.0463)***
UTAH - - -
NUM of OBS 53341 78504 100013
y Standard errors are in parentheses.
z Robust variance estimate that adjusts for within-cluster correlation is used.
x **: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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Table 6. Synthetic Panel Data Model: Careful vs. Careless Group
Primary States Neighboring States
Dependent Variables CAREFULL CARELESS CAREFUL CARELESS
PRIMARY .9989 (.1794)*** -.2644 (.1487)* -1.0558 (.1726)*** .1300 (.1637)
MALE .5254 (.1085)*** .3574 (.0981)*** .4478 (.0946)*** .2954 (.1156)**
AGE 1 -.3717 (.1624)** .1773 (.1078) .0025 (.1422) .0153 (.1600)
AGE 2 -.4324 (.1339)*** -.0824 (.1368) -.3208 (.1426)** -.1212 (.1417)
AGE 3 -.5912 (.1329)*** -.4008 (.1532)*** -.6102 (.1465)*** -.6656 (.1675)***
YEAR 2004 -.4905 (.2434)** -.5606 (.2037)*** -2.4161 (.2126)*** -.0190 (.2811)
YEAR 2005 -.1734 (.1485) -.2956 (.1620)* -1.7999 (.1807)*** -.1322 (.2133)
YEAR 2006 -.1859 (.1340) -.4844 (.2009)** -.6594 (.1091)*** .0718 (.2209)
YEAR 2007 -.0380 (.1080) -.0744 (.1639) -.0439 (.1617) .3650 (.2030)*
ALASKA - - - -
KENTUCKY -.7229 (.1398)*** -.9300 (.0753)*** - -
MAINE - - - -
MISSISSIPPI -3.6230 (.1601)*** -4.2661 (.1941)*** - -
N CAROLINA - - - -
S CAROLINA -3.9119 (.1867)*** -3.8927 (.1423)*** - -
TENNESSEE -.7767 (.1562)*** -1.1799 (.0890)*** - -
HAWAII - - - -
OHIO - - 4.9764 (.1896)*** 4.1348 (.2904)***
NEW HAM - - - -
LOUISIANA - - - -
VIRGINIA - - 3.9992 (.1771)*** 3.8626 (.2981)***
GEORGIA - - 1.5633 (.1856)*** 1.0895 (.3416)***
ALABAMA - - 4.9399 (.1975)*** 4.7880 (.2803)***
Num. of Obs. 199 193 199 184
Num. of Groups 8 8 8 8
R2:within .8466 .8725 .9100 .8386
R2:between .9912 .9100 .9778 .9462
R2:overall .8508 .8730 .9116 .8418
Note : Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Two states, Alaska and Maine, are not used for this estimation
because the number of observations in each cohort is too small.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
34
Table 7. Synthetic Panel Data Model: Non-Pedestrian vs. Pedestrian Group
Primary States Neighboring States
Dependent Variables NON PEDS PEDS NON PEDS PEDS
PRIMARY .0525 (.0637) .2306 (.2813) -.0842 (.0694) -.0605 (.2226)
MALE .4690 (.0384)*** .5026 (.1457)*** .4118 (.0707)*** .2644 (.1072)**
AGE 1 -.1630 (.0538)*** -.0701 (.1903) .0345 (.0821) -.3841 (.1472)***
AGE 2 -.3672 (.0482)*** -.5351 (.2230)** -.3575 (.1094)*** -.5772 (.1455)***
AGE 3 -.5470 (.0581)*** -.4225 (.1958)** -.5912 (.0848)*** -.8924 (.1470)***
YEAR 2004 .1367 (.0841) .3706 (.3748) -.0604 (.1151) .1931 (.2728)
YEAR 2005 .1757 (.0672)*** .1449 (.3141) .0576 (.0810) -.0554 (.2294)
YEAR 2006 .1807 (.0558)*** .1331 (.2760) .0196 (.0691) -.0197 (.2067)
YEAR 2007 -.0046 (.0613) .4239 (.2338)* .0137 (.0738) .2639 (.1545)*
ALASKA - - - -
KENTUCKY -1.3101 (.0412)*** -.5571 (.2171)** - -
MAINE - - - -
MISSISSIPPI -3.4005 (.0511)*** -2.4554 (.3324)*** - -
N CAROLINA - - - -
S CAROLINA -3.8466 (.0737)*** -2.4955 (.3054)*** - -
TENNESSEE -.5204 (.0554)*** -.6413 (.1905)*** - -
HAWAII - - - -
OHIO - - 4.7743 (.1016)*** 2.9639 (.6682)***
NEW HAM - - - -
LOUISIANA - - - -
VIRGINIA - - 3.6391 (.1067)*** 2.0912 (.6714)***
GEORGIA - - 1.4244 (.1119)*** .0142 (.6800)
ALABAMA - - 5.1465 (.1028)*** 2.5844 (.6742)***
Num. of Obs. 200 125 200 143
Num. of Groups 8 8 8 8
R2:within .9749 .5050 .9738 .7319
R2:between .9888 .8806 .9670 .9041
R2:overall .9754 .5206 .9736 .7505
Note : Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Two states, Alaska and Maine, are not used for this estimation
because the number of observations in each cohort is too small.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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Table 8. Synthetic Panel Data Model: Ratios
Primary States Neighboring States
Dependent Variable (CARELESSTOTAL ) (
CARELESS
TOTAL )
PRIMARY -.2168 (.0346)*** .1948 (.0350)***
MALE -.0109 (.0251) .0127 (.0214)
AGE 1 .0536 (.0328) .0275 (.0312)
AGE 2 .0406 (.0337) .0402 (.0327)
AGE 3 .0250 (.0324) .0033 (.0316)
YEAR 2003 -.0123 (.0444) .3506 (.0479)***
YEAR 2004 -.0329 (.0287) .2412 (.0383)***
YEAR 2005 -.0076 (.0279) .0864 (.0328)***
YEAR 2006 .0117 (.0207) .0273 (.0338)
ALASKA - -
KENTUCKY -.0551 (.0207)*** -
MAINE - -
MISSISSIPPI -.0722 (.0295)** -
N CAROLINA - -
S CAROLINA -.0076 (.0389) -
TENNESSEE -.0415 (.0267) -
HAWAII - -
OHIO - -.0875 (.0427)**
NEW HAM - -
LOUISIANA - -
VIRGINIA - .0048 (.0410)
GEORGIA - -.0106 (.0467)
ALABAMA - .0323 (.0469)
Num. of Obs. 200 199
Num. of Groups 8 8
R2:within .3673 .2597
R2:between .4756 .8559
R2:overall .3705 .2672
Note : Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Two states, Alaska and Maine, are not used for this estimation
because the number of observations in each cohort is too small.
**: Signicant at the 5-percent level. ***: Signicant at the 1-percent level.
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APPENDIX A. Description of Variables
Variable Description Dummy
Dependent variables:
CARELESS x Careless driving behavior: Y
1 if the driver shows careless driving behavior, 0 otherwise
NON OCCUPANT Non-occupants' involvement Y
1 if non-occupants are involved, 0 otherwise
Independent Variables:
PRIMARY x Primary seat belt law: 1 if an accident occurs Y
in the state with the law, 0 if otherwise
AGE Age of the person (years) Y
MALE x Gender: 1 if male, 0 if female Y
ALCOHOL Police-reported alcohol involvement in accidents Y
1 if the person had consumed an alcoholic beverage, 0 if not
STRIKING Vehicle's role in accidents: 1 if a vehicle is striking Y
V EHICLE AGE Dierence between the current year and the model year N
V EHICLE AGE SQ Square of V EHICLE AGE N
AGE 1 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is between 16 and 25 Y
AGE 2 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is between 26 and 35 Y
AGE 3 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is between 36 and 45 Y
AGE 4 x Age: 1 if the driver's age is over 46 Y
NIGHT Hour of crash Y
1 if accident occurs between 7:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. Y
HIGH POP Population Density: Y
1 if within area of population of 100,000 +, 0 if less than 100,000
DRY SURFACE 1 if condition of road surface at the time of crash is dry, 0 otherwise Y
GOOD WEATHER General weather conditions: Y
1 if it is good, 0 if there was any adverse condition Y
LIGHT General light conditions: 1 if daylight, 0 otherwise Y
HIGHWAY Interstate Highway Y
1 if the crash occurred on an interstate highway, 0 otherwise
INTERCHANGE 1 if the rst harmful event is located Y
within an interchange area, 0 otherwise
SPEED LIMIT Actual posted speed limit (miles per hour) N
Y EAR 2004 x Year dummy Y
...
...
Y EAR 2008 x Year dummy Y
ALASKA x State dummy Y
...
...
UTAH x State dummy Y
Note : x indicates that the denition of the variable is same in the synthetic panel data model.
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Appendix B-1. Summary Statistics for 7 Neighboring States
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variables:
Careless Action 40786 .1581 .3648 0 1 CARELESS
Involvement of Non-Occupants 78535 .0157 .1242 0 1 NON OCCUPANT
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 78535 .6669 .4713 0 1 PRIMARY
Age 78535 36.9222 16.1927 16 97 AGE
Sex 78535 .5802 .4935 0 1 MALE
Alcohol Consumption 78535 .0662 .2486 0 1 ALCOHOL
Striking Vehicle 78535 .6357 .4812 0 1 STRIKING
Vehicle Age 78535 7.3715 5.3895 0 82 V EHICLE AGE
Vehicle Age Square 78535 83.3862 130.3187 0 6724 V EHICLE AGE SQ
Hour of Crash 78535 .2426 .4287 0 1 NIGHT
Population Density 78535 .2999 .4582 0 1 HIGH POP
Road Condition 78535 .7790 .4149 0 1 DRY SURFACE
Weather Condition 78535 .8428 .3640 0 1 GOOD WEATHER
Light Condition 78535 .6925 .4615 0 1 LIGHT
Inter-State Highway 78535 .1305 .3368 0 1 HIGHWAY
Relation to Junction 78535 .0471 .2118 0 1 INTERCHANGE
Maximum Speed Limit 78535 45.0702 12.4350 0 75 SPEED LIMIT
Year Dummy 2004 78535 .2164 .4118 0 1 Y EAR 2004
Year Dummy 2005 78535 .1915 .3935 0 1 Y EAR 2005
Year Dummy 2006 78535 .1991 .3993 0 1 Y EAR 2006
Year Dummy 2007 78535 .2075 .4055 0 1 Y EAR 2007
Year Dummy 2008 78535 .1855 .3887 0 1 Y EAR 2008
State Dummy Hawaii 78535 .0004 .0199 0 1 HAWAII
State Dummy Ohio 78535 .3223 .4674 0 1 OHIO
State Dummy New Hampshire 78535 .0021 .0458 0 1 NEW HAM
State Dummy Louisiana 78535 .0050 .0708 0 1 LOUISIANA
State Dummy Virginia 78535 .1759 .3808 0 1 V IRGINIA
State Dummy Georgia 78535 .0183 .1341 0 1 GEORGIA
State Dummy Alabama 78535 .4759 .4994 0 1 ALABAMA
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Appendix B-2. Summary Statistics for 7 Randomly Assigned States
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variables:
Careless Action 66951 .1366 .3434 0 1 CARELESS
Involvement of Non-Occupants 100013 .0483 .2144 0 1 NON OCCUPANT
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 100013 .4407 .4965 0 1 PRIMARY
Age 100013 39.6177 16.7371 16 106 AGE
Sex 100013 .6318 .4823 0 1 MALE
Alcohol Consumption 100013 .0586 .2349 0 1 ALCOHOL
Striking Vehicle 100013 .6059 .4887 0 1 STRIKING
Vehicle Age 100013 6.8711 5.2272 0 92 V EHICLE AGE
Vehicle Age Square 100013 74.5358 118.0511 0 8464 V EHICLE AGE SQ
Hour of Crash 100013 .2567 .4368 0 1 NIGHT
Population Density 100013 .2882 .4529 0 1 HIGH POP
Road Condition 100013 .8026 .3980 0 1 DRY SURFACE
Weather Condition 100013 .8638 .3430 0 1 GOOD WEATHER
Light Condition 100013 .6963 .4598 0 1 LIGHT
Inter-State Highway 100013 .0909 .2875 0 1 HIGHWAY
Relation to Junction 100013 .0290 .1679 0 1 INTERCHANGE
Maximum Speed Limit 100013 39.4604 12.4995 0 75 SPEED LIMIT
Year Dummy 2004 100013 .2100 .4073 0 1 Y EAR 2004
Year Dummy 2005 100013 .1937 .3952 0 1 Y EAR 2005
Year Dummy 2006 100013 .1932 .3948 0 1 Y EAR 2006
Year Dummy 2007 100013 .2142 .4103 0 1 Y EAR 2007
Year Dummy 2008 100013 .1890 .3915 0 1 Y EAR 2008
State Dummy Idaho 100013 .0014 .0377 0 1 IDAHO
State Dummy Connecticut 100013 .0046 .0677 0 1 CONNECTICUT
State Dummy New York 100013 .3303 .4703 0 1 NEW YORK
State Dummy Virginia 100013 .1382 .3451 0 1 V IRGINIA
State Dummy Pennsylvania 100013 .1654 .3716 0 1 PENNSY LV ANIA
State Dummy Florida 100013 .3587 .4796 0 1 FLORIDA
State Dummy Utah 100013 .0014 .0377 0 1 UTAH
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APPENDIX C. Summary Statistics - Synthetic Panel Model (Neighboring State)
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max Acronym
Dependent variable:
# of Careless Drivers 200 20772.10 29002.95 0 152340.70 CARELESS
# of Non-Careless Drivers 200 3209.45 3795.36 0 22592.63 CAREFUL
Total # of Driversy 200 23981.55 32123.29 0 171330.00 TOTAL
Ln CARELESS 199 8.5495 2.1657 1.5261 11.9339 Ln CARELESS
Ln CAREFUL 184 7.1085 1.9672 .6931 10.0254 Ln CAREFUL
CAREFUL=TOTAL 199 .1850 .1699 0 .9783 CAREFUL=TOTAL
# of Drivers with Peds 200 46709.71 51196.47 51.96 189921.30 PEDS
# of Drivers with No Peds 200 303.99 363.34 0 2146.27 NON PEDS
Total # of Driversz 200 47013.70 51450.19 51.96 190512.5 TOTAL
Ln PEDS 200 9.5091 2.0400 3.9505 12.1544 Ln PEDS
Ln NON PEDS 143 5.5489 1.2101 1.6506 7.6715 Ln NON PEDS
NON PEDS=TOTAL 200 .0069 .0099 0 .0963 NON PEDS=TOTAL
Independent variables:
Primary Seat Belt Law 200 .6 .4911 0 1 PRIMARY
Sex 280 .5 .5009 0 1 MALE
Age between 16 and 25 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 1
Age between 26 and 35 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 2
Age between 36 and 45 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 3
Age over 46 280 .25 .4338 0 1 AGE 4
Year Dummy 2004 280 .2 .4007 0 1 Y EAR 2003
...
Year Dummy 2008 280 .2 .4007 0 1 Y EAR 2007
State Dummy Hawaii 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 HAWAII
State Dummy Ohio 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 OHIO
State Dummy New Hampshire 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 NEW HAM
State Dummy Louisiana 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 LOUISIANA
State Dummy Virginia 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 V IRGINIA
State Dummy Georgia 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 GEORGIA
State Dummy Alabama 280 .1428 .3506 0 1 ALABAMA
* Summary statistics for neighboring states are in the appendix.
y Sum of careless and non careless drivers in accidents.
z Sum of drivers with pedestrian and no pedestrian involvement in accidents.
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APPENDIX D.1. People Involved in Accidents in 7 States over the 5 Years
Person Type Freq Percent
Driver of a Motor Vehicle in Transport 57700 70.32
Passenger of a Motor Vehicle in Transport 23475 28.61
Occupant of a Motor Vehicle Not in Transport 108 .13
Occupant of a Non-Motor Vehicle Transport Device 14 .02
Pedestrian 508 .62
Cyclist (Pedalcyclist) 244 .30
Person in or on a Working Vehicle 4 .00
Other or Unknown 2 .00
Total 82055 100.00
Note : The data set comes from the GES.
Since the GES data are from a probability sample of police-reported trac crashes,
national estimates can be made from these data. Refer to \NASS GES Analytical
Users Manual, 1988 - 2013" regarding the methodology for this.
APPENDIX D.2. Injury Severity of Individuals
All individuals Pedestrians & Cyclists
Severity level Frequency Percent Frequency Percent y
No injury 52072 63.46 11 .01
Possible injury 13356 16.28 43 .06
Non-incapacitating injury 10491 12.79 458 .61
Incapacitating injury 5042 6.14 176 .23
Fatal injury 949 1.16 60 .08
Injured, Severity Unknown 138 .17 4 .01
Died Prior to Crash 7 .01 0 .00
Total 82055 100.00 752 100.00
y All individuals involved.
APPENDIX D.3. Non-Occupant Action with Fatal Injury
Non-Occupant Action Pedesrtians & Cyclists
Frequency Percent
No Action 6 .10
Non-motorist vehicle operator 1 .17
Darting or running into road 12 .20
Improper Crossing of roadway or intersection (Jaywalking) 13 .22
Jogging 1 .02
Walking with or against trac 11 .18
Playing, working, sitting, lying, standing, etc in roadway 8 .13
Other or unknown action 7 .12
Total 60 100.00
y All individuals involved.
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